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CIVIL SOCIETY, CIVIC VIRTUE, AND LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY
WILLIAM A. GALSTON*
I am implicated in both of the reports that come in for their share
of criticism in the pages of this symposium. Each of these reports
represents something rare in both politics and academia -namely, an
effort to find common ground among individuals with shared
concerns but very diverse political and moral outlooks. To some
extent, each represents a compromise among these perspectives; each
participant would have written a somewhat different report. Under
the circumstances, my most useful contribution to this symposium
may well be a statement of my personal views and of the reasons for
them. Along the way, I shall reply to the objections leveled against
the two reports.
To begin, I see the vocabularies of economics and culture as
complementary, not contradictory. Among other things, I favor raising
the minimum wage, increasing the earned income tax credit, helping
low-wage workers with subsidies for health care, child care, and job
training, expanding Head Start, and broadening federal support for
public education in low-income communities. I do not believe that civil
society, however vigorous, could or should replace a national governing
agenda.
Nor do I believe that civil society is self-sustaining in the absence
of the state. As many central European countries are learning the hard
way, civil society requires a framework of legislation that secures the
possibility of associational self-constitution and perpetuation over time.
Moreover, many civil associations have entered into, and some depend
upon, partnerships with the public sector to address public problems.
(Along with many others, including both contenders for the year 2000
Democratic presidential nomination, I have advocated the expansion
of such partnerships.)
It is an exaggeration, however, to suggest that civil society is
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somehow a creation of government. Indeed, the modem idea of civil
society was developed in response to the independence of revealed
religion from state authority, and to the growing diversity of creeds.
So, for example, the public law of the United States recognizes, and to
some extent regulates, the Catholic Church. But it would be a wild
exaggeration to suggest that U.S. public law "constitutes" the Church.
It is, therefore, a complicated matter, but not (as Professor Tushnet
suggests) inherently paradoxical,1 to seek the revitalization of civil
society as a check on government.
To say, as I do, that the vocabularies of economics and culture are
complementary is to deny that one is reducible to the other. William
Julius Wilson, frequently cited in these pages, is a first-rate scholar and
an honest man. And because he is both, he has reexamined the
evidence and has come around to the view that cultural change is an
important, ineliminable, independent variable in any comprehensive
explanation of phenomena such as the decline of marriage in African-
American communities. 2
Nor do I believe that civil society should be understood
exclusively, or even primarily, as a school of citizenship. Indeed, casual
inspection reveals the multiplicity of functions voluntary associations
can perform in contemporary regimes. These associations can serve as
sites of resistance against tyranny and oppression. By strengthening
social bonds, they can reduce the dangers of anomie. Through their
internal dialogue and activities, they can help form opinions that shape
deliberation in public institutions. They provide vehicles for the non-
instrumental expression of moral convictions as norms for the wider
society. They offer opportunities for groups of citizens to conduct
important public work through collective mechanisms outside the
control of government. And yes, they can foster the virtues that
modem democratic societies need and can nourish the habits of civic
engagement.
It is because I do not believe that fostering citizenship is the only
legitimate or important function of civil society that I join Nancy
Rosenblum in rejecting what she calls the "logic of congruence. ''3 But
it is important to see that this rejection is a two-edged sword. On the
1. See Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 379, 380
(2000).
2. See William Julius Wilson, Public Policy Research and the Truly Disadvantaged, in THE
URBAN UNDERCLASS 460, 468 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
3. Nancy L. Rosenblum, Primus Inter Pares: Political Parties and Civil Society, 75 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 493, 508 (2000).
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one hand, there is no guarantee that any particular civil association will
reinforce liberal democratic virtues and beliefs. On the other hand,
there is no requirement -moral or legal-that every association mirror
liberal democratic norms and structures. So while the editors of this
symposium endorse Rosenblum's overall position, they reject her
critique of the Roberts v. United States Jaycees decision.4 They cannot
have it both ways. Rosenblum's general stance leads directly to her
specific conclusions about the inappropriateness of government
intervention to enforce gender equality throughout civil society. To
reject her conclusion is necessarily to reject the premises on which it
rests.5
Nor do I accept the view that asserting and exercising rights are
per se inimical to virtue. Here is what I do believe and have stated
repeatedly in my published work:
First, there is a distinction between real and bogus rights. The
right to vote is a real right. The right to welfare is a bogus right. (That
is why it is perfectly consistent to support the Voting Rights Act while
opposing the National Welfare Rights Organization.) Claiming a real
right is central to human dignity and virtue; asserting a bogus right is
just the reverse.
Second, there is a distinction between rights and rightness. To say
"I have a right to do X" is not necessarily to conclude that "X is the
right thing for me to do." Even though I may have the right to address
someone in uncivil and insulting terms, there may nonetheless be
compelling reasons for me not to do so. To fill in the gap between
rights and rightness, we need a much richer moral vocabulary,
including some account of the virtues.
It is possible to argue that this virtue-talk is beside the point
because liberal democracy can be sustained through the artful
arrangement of institutions that use unrefined passions and interests to
check one another. I think it is fair to say that this brand of
institutionalism is a distinctly minority view today, certainly among
ordinary citizens and increasingly among scholars as well. People who
disagree vigorously about political agendas nonetheless agree that
4. See Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-
Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 301, 317 n.79 (2000).
5. Obviously, the objections against imposing state norms on voluntary associations can
be evaded by relabelling these associations as "public" (accommodations, or whatever). This is
precisely the strategy against which Rosenblum protests. See generally Nancy L. Rosenblum,
Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the Dynamic of Exclusion, in
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 75 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998). So to categorize the Jaycees as a
public accommodation is to reject one of the crucial premises of Rosenblum's argument.
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sustainable self-government requires certain belief, dispositions, and
habits, which for brevity's sake may be called "civic virtues."
To acknowledge this is to open rather than close the conversation.
For we must then grapple with two questions: Is civil society a reliable
or sufficient source of whatever virtues liberal democracy may require?
And what is the actual substance of these virtues, anyway?
I can answer the first question straightforwardly. I have never
claimed that civil society is or could be sufficient, and neither have
most of the individuals lumped together under the civil revivalist
rubric. That is why I have argued for a strong program of civic and
character education in our public schools. And that is why some of the
sharpest and most controversial recommendations in the report of the
National Commission on Civic Renewal revolve around a mandatory
program of civic education throughout the primary and secondary
school years.6
As to the second question, it is surely necessary to ask on what
basis anyone could offer a substantive account of liberal democratic
virtues suitable for a culturally and morally diverse society. Along with
others, I have argued that such an account can only be functional or
instrumental, encompassing the traits of character and habits of the
heart needed to sustain civic independence and self-government amidst
diversity. I have spelled out just such an account in considerable
detail.7 I freely acknowledge what I have argued for a decade: the
relationship between civil society and liberal democracy is an empirical
rather than philosophical issue. That is precisely why I make such
extensive use of empirical evidence in my work.
This brings me to the family. Professor Fineman suggests that the
empirical evidence connecting family structure to child well-being is
shaky and controversial.8 In support of this critique, she approvingly
cites a recent unpublished paper by Andrew Lister. Buried in one of
her footnotes is the following sentence: "Lister stated.., that the 'best
research' does seem to indicate that growing up in a single parent
family is not good for children" 9-which is my position. Anyone with
even minimal social science competence is aware of the need to hold
6. THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON Civic RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: How
Civic DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 14-15 (1998).
7. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY
IN THE LIBERAL STATE 213-37 (1991).
& See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Family in Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531,
542 (2000).
9. Id. at 542 n. 80.
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background variables constant, and the best research does just that.
Indeed, the McLanahan and Sandefur study, which Fineman cites as a
source of "caveats," concludes that after holding background variables
constant, there is an independent effect of family structure on child
well-being. 10 Other researchers, such as Johns Hopkins' respected
Andrew Cherlin, have examined new data sets and have concluded
that even after correcting for levels of intra-family conflict, there is an
independent effect of divorce on child well-being.11
Not surprisingly, given the weight of the evidence, Professor
Fineman endorses Lister's suggestion that we change the focus from
empirical issues to the "moral balancing involved in setting family
policy. ' 12  I am happy to take up that challenge. Indeed, moral
balancing is exactly what is required, because the interests of parents
do not always coincide with the interests of children and because the
interests of women do not always coincide with the interests of men.
In a free society, individuals have the right to constitute their own
lives-up to the point where a particular form of self-constitution
contradicts a binding obligation. For example, grown children are not
morally free to define their lives in a manner that neglects their
responsibility to help care for aging parents. There is a range of
legitimate ways in which we can discharge this responsibility. But we
are not at liberty to ignore it outright, in the name of liberation, self-
actualization, or whatever.
Similar considerations are at work in relationships between
parents and minor children. The act of begetting a child (or of
accepting a child through adoption) creates responsibilities that we are
not free to ignore. It is for this reason that the state has the right to
impose and enforce child support awards. It is for the same reason that
the state can legitimately shape the laws of marriage and divorce to
promote the best interests of children. Being a parent is not consistent
with unlimited "self-constitution."
Let me get one issue off the table. Domestic violence is not a
10. SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT:
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 95-133 (1994).
11. See generally PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BooTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING
UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL (1997); Andrew J. Cherlin et al., Effects of Divorce on
Mental Health Through the Life Course, in HOPKINS POPULATION CENTER PAPERS ON
POPULATION (WP 97-1, 1997); Andrew J. Cherlin et al., Parental Divorce in Childhood and
Demographic Outcomes in Young Adulthood, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 299 (1995); P. Lindsay Chase-
Lansdale et al., The Long-Term Effects of Parental Divorce on the Mental Health of Young
Adults: A Developmental Perspective, 66 CHILD DEV. 1614 (1995).
12. Fineman, supra note 8, at 543.
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private matter, and it cannot be condoned. The state rightly intervenes
to prevent and-that failing-to punish abuse. On any plausible view,
it gives the abused parties the moral and legal right to terminate the
marriage and restrict the parental rights of the abuser.
But it does not follow that all desires or frustrations within
marriages trigger a legitimate right of exit. Childless couples are free to
act in ways that couples with minor children are not. Husbands who
break up their marriages to pursue their secretaries are harming their
children and wronging their spouses. Wives who break up their
marriages because of a lack of emotional intimacy with their husbands
are likewise harming their children. The man may feel better in the
new relationship; the woman may feel better when rid of a spouse she
experiences as remote and unresponsive. But the children typically
feel worse, and many suffer long-term harm from their parents'
heedless actions. Are these facts morally irrelevant? Is the law
forbidden to take cognizance of them?
Let me extend this argument. Whatever may be the case for
peasant societies, most fifteen year olds in advanced industrial societies
are not equipped to be parents. The public sector can provide material
assistance, of course, but that does not begin to close the competency
gap. It is wrong to bring a child into the world if one is not adequately
prepared to raise the child. It is not an instance of intrusive moralism
for society to recognize and act on this fact. "Private" harm to children
imposes public costs, and poorly raised children are less likely to
become good citizens-however one defines citizenship.
The relationship between economic and cultural change is more
complex than many fashionable accounts would suggest, a fact of
considerable significance for family policy. For example, Professor
Fineman notes that the rate of poverty among families rose
substantially between 1977 and 1993.13 What she does not say is that
13. See Fineman, supra note 8, at 547. It has fallen significantly since then, however;
Professor Fineman really should update her statistics. For example, the child poverty rate today
is about what it was 20 years ago, at the 1979 cyclical economic peak. See Isabel V. Sawhill,
Families at Risk, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 2000 ELECrION AND BEYOND 97,106
(Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer eds., 1999). The poverty rate among children born to
post-teen married parents with at least high school degrees has declined to eight percent. See id.
at 108. From 1976 to 1996, the inflation-adjusted median income of married couples with minor
children has risen from just over $45,500 to almost $52,000. See U.S. Census Bureau, Table A6,
Selected Measures of Household Income, 1969 to 1996: Married-Couple Households with Related
Children Under 18 Years Old (last modified Feb. 3, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/hhes/
income/mednhhld/ta6.html>. She should also be more careful to compare like with like. For
example, she notes that real family income fell slightly between 1973 and 1992. See Fineman,
supra note 8, at 547. But 1973 was close to a peak of one economic cycle, while 1992 was close
to the trough of another. A methodologically appropriate peak-to-peak comparison-1973 to
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much of this increase stemmed from the surge in the percentage of
families headed by single parents. The past generation has been
relatively good for married couples but bad for single-parent families.14
On a related note: Professor Fineman takes me to task for allegedly
overlooking the existence of poverty among two-parent families. 5 Of
course I do not. The point I am making is statistical: holding other
variables constant, two-parent families are far less likely to be living in
poverty than are single-parent families. To say, as I do, that stable
intact families are the single best anti-poverty program is not to suggest
that it will be sufficient in every case. That is why I favor, in addition,
the wide range of programs I enumerated at the beginning of this
article to provide income and supplementary services to low-income
working families.
Nor is the relationship between family well-being and recent
public policy as straightforward as Professor Fineman suggests. It is at
most a half-truth to claim the policy shifts at the national level have
exacerbated rising income inequality. The 1986 Tax Reform Act
championed by Bill Bradley closed numerous loopholes used only by
the wealthy.16 The 1993 Clinton economic program raised taxes on the
upper one percent of all families while dramatically increasing the
Earned Income Tax Credit and removing millions of low-income
Americans from the tax rolls altogether. 7  Medicaid has been
expanded, as has support for child care. 8 Indeed, over the part fifteen
years, inflation-adjusted federal assistance to low-income working
families has increased nearly tenfold.19 To be sure, there has been an
historic shift away from open-ended income supports for families with
no worker outside the home. But even the welfare reform act of 1996,
which Professor Fineman excoriates, yielded a net increase in federal
support for low-income families, and its overall results have thus far
1989, or 1973 to 1999-would yield a different result.
14. For all this and much more, see generally Sawhill, supra note 13.
15. See Fineman, supra note 8, at 540.
16. See Henry J. Aaron et al., The Rock Road to Tax Reform, in SETrING NATIONAL
PRIORITIES, supra note 13, at 211.
17. See generally Gary Burtless, Growing American Inequality: Sources and Remedies, in
SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES, supra note 16, at 137 (discussing the structure of the current
federal tax system and proposing tax reform).
18. For a clear summary and explanation of current federal and state outlays for child care,
see Sawhill, supra note 13, at 115-20. For additional discussion of child care and medicaid
expansions, see David T. Ellwood, The Plight of the Working Poor, BROOKINGS CHILDREN'S
ROUNDTABLE, Nov. 1999, at 2 (on file with author).
19. As David Ellwood shows, inflation-adjusted federal spending for low-income working
families rose from less than six billion dollars in 1984 to nearly $52 billion in 1999. Ellwood,
supra note 18, at 2, 4.
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exceeded the expectation of its detractors (and of its supporters as
well).20
The real disagreement between us goes far deeper than these
policy disputes. Professor Fineman evidently believes that the basis of
family policy should shift from the male-female dyad to a maternal
model subsidized by the state. I believe that the state should
supplement, not supplant, the efforts of mothers and fathers to raise
their children. Professor Fineman evidently believes that fathers are
dispensable. I disagree. As Professor Fineman observes, some women
feel that it is "easier" to do without fathers.21 Maybe so. But that
choice is not necessarily better for their children. And while women
have the legal right to make that choice, the state is under no obligation
to facilitate it.
We reach, finally, the "troubling [moral] accountings" for which
the editors of this symposium and Professor Roberts take me to task.22
My basic argument is straightforward: a number of fundamental
changes have occurred in our public culture over the past four decades.
Some are positive, while others are negative. Taken together, these
changes have transformed American society. But whether the results
have left us, on balance, better or worse off is not as simple a question
as many suppose.
It seems unobjectionable on its face to suggest that not all these
changes have the same moral valence. So the real objection must ie
elsewhere. I suppose one could argue that the trends I regard as
negative-violent crime, drug abuse, teen pregnancy, among others-
are not really negative after all. But the defenders of these sorts of
activities as expressions of personal freedom or of revolutionary
outrage against capitalist oppression are much rarer than they were a
quarter century ago.
More interestingly, one could argue that these trends in our public
culture are apples and oranges, with no real connections among them.
Let me address this challenge head-on. Like the rest of my generation,
20. For example, while welfare rolls have declined sharply, the child poverty rate has fallen
from 22% to 19%, the lowest rate in more than a decade; meanwhile, the labor force
participation rate of low-wage unmarried women with children has surged from 32% to 50% in
just the past five years. See David T. Ellwood, The Working Poor Policy Brief, Figure 2 (Nov.
1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Isabel Sawhill, Antipoverty Effectiveness of
Policies for the Working Poor, Chart 5 (Nov. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
21. Fineman, supra note 8, at 544.
22. McClain & Fleming, supra note 4, at 336-39; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Moral
Exclusivity of the New Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 555, 569-74 (2000).
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I lived through a tumultuous period in which the undoubted fact that
some hierarchies are illegitimate was taken as warrant for the
conclusion that all hierarchies are illegitimate, in which the undoubted
fact that some norms are arbitrary and repressive was taken as
evidence that all are, and in which the undoubted fact that some
differences are socially constructed fortified the ideological prejudice
that all are. I believe -unrepentently-- that the process of claiming
real rights helped generate a climate of opinion in which others were
emboldened to assert bogus rights. This is not-repeat, not-an
argument against claiming real rights. It is an argument against
imputing the moral value of real rights to any and every claim
advanced in the name of expanding rights.
I suppose my critics could reject the distinction between real and
purported rights. They would be unwise to do so. Rights, let us recall,
are claims advanced against political power-even the power of
democratic governments. A public arena densely packed with rights-
claims is one that will necessarily be less responsive to democratic
majorities.
Professor Fineman is uncomfortable with the use of even
sophisticated means for assessing public sentiment and judgment. On
the surface, the objection is to the accuracy of these survey
instruments.23  But the real objection is to the idea that public
judgments, however accurately represented, should influence public
policy, at least when these judgments lead to policy conclusions that the
critics do not like.
It is not my view that democratic public judgment ends all debate
about the wisdom and morality of public decisions. But surely in a
democracy it is the beginning of wisdom to take public judgments into
account. When an overwhelming majority of the people concludes that
it is morally unacceptable to continue welfare as we know it, the
burden of proof rests on a democratic political system that resists this
conclusion. Similarly, when survey after survey stretching over a
decade reveal profound public ambivalence about the moral condition
of American society (and about the overall effect of the cultural
changes of recent decades), democratic social theorists would be well
advised to give these views respectful consideration.
Indeed, the people have good reason for their ambivalence. While
they value the increase in autonomy and individual choice, they fear
that these gains have come at the expense of social bonds they also
23. See Fineman, supra note 8, at 523-33, 541-42.
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value. And while they endorse the deconstruction of oppressive
hierarchies, they are not convinced that the revitalized communities
they desire are possible without some form of authority.
I believe that it is important, morally as well as politically, to
engage seriously with these deeply felt public beliefs. For if academic
political and social theory fails to do so, it runs the risk of missing the
kind of public engagement and influence it seeks and of speaking to
and for itself.
